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Summary
This paper discusses the use of agent-based simulation models for regulatory advice in elec-
tricity market regulation. It briefly introduces the necessary procedures and the state-of-the-art
of the methodology, and outlines its possible range of application. In a second part, the paper
presents an agent-based simulation model developed by the authors. The model can be applied
for analyzing different market designs and market structures in order to derive evidence for
regulatory advice. This is exemplified through the analysis of two settlement rules in the bal-
ancing power market and of several divestiture scenarios of the German electricity sector.
1 Introduction
The electricity sector is characterized by technical constraints, multiple interlinked mar-
kets, and an oligopolistic structure with vertical integration. Asymmetric information,
imperfect competition, strategic interaction, collective learning, and the possibility of
multiple equilibria are further difficult aspects that characterize the electricity sector,
like economies in general (Tesfatsion 2006). The ensemble of these aspects make elec-
tricity markets rank among the most complex of all commodity markets operated at pre-
sent, and push most classical economic modeling methods to their limits.
The complexity of the electricity sector and its high importance for a competitive econ-
omy calls for new modeling methods that help gaining insights into the dynamics of po-
wer markets. The agent-based (AB) modeling methodology, or more specifically the field
of Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE), provides more flexibility for properly
representing relevant complex and may help to overcome some of the limits of traditional
modeling methods, like e.g. too strict assumptions. With ACE research, the focus in eco-
nomic analysis is shifted from rational behavior and equilibrium towards heterogeneity
and adaptivity. The tremendous availability of computational resources made it possible
to set up large-scale and detailed computational models that allow a high degree of de-
sign flexibility. Populations of heterogeneous agents, feedback from interaction, and dy-
namic processes make up the core of computational economic models.
Although it constitutes a change in economic modeling paradigm, the agent-based ap-
proach does not need to be seen in sharp contrast with analytical modeling. Like Gulyás
(2002) argues, an agent-based implementation is “rather a matter of degree than a binary
choice”. When moving from top-down approaches in which firms or other actors are
represented on an aggregate level, via an entity-level representation of actors, down
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to the introduction of autonomous agents as actor representatives, frontiers between the
modeling paradigms are fluent. However, with each step towards an agent-based imple-
mentation, the modeler gains flexibility, as more aspects, like e.g. heterogeneity of
agents, can be accounted for.
During the last decade, many agent-based simulation models of electricity markets have
been developed. A majority of these approaches use reinforcement learning algorithms
for representing the adaptive behavior of players in the market, e.g. Sun/Tesfatsion
(2007), Nicolaisen et al. (2001), Bower/Bunn (2001); the use of genetic algorithms
(e.g. Cau/Anderson (2003) or learning classifier systems (e.g. Bagnall/Smith 2005) is
less frequent in AB electricity market modeling. While earlier models represent the elec-
tricity sector as one single, strongly simplified market, some recent models comprise sev-
eral markets (Sun/Tesfatsion 2007), and explicitly model interrelations between them
(Rupérez Micola et al. 2006).
In most models, the agent’s learning task is to set profit-maximizing offer prices or mark-
ups. Capacity withholding strategies are mostly not modeled explicitly; however, setting
a high offer price can also be interpreted as (economic) withholding. Another observa-
tion from surveying the agent-based electricity simulation literature is that the majority
of models still neglect transmission grid constraints (although recent developments go
into the direction of taking transmission into account, e.g. Sun/Tesfatsion (2007), and
most models represent the demand side as a fixed, price-insensitive load.
ACE models serve for explaining, understanding, and analyzing socio-economic phe-
nomena. Among the ACE research strands that Tesfatsion (2006) identifies, most elec-
tricity related research can be categorized into the normative strand. Agent-based simu-
lation models are used as fully controllable virtual laboratories for testing economic de-
sign alternatives in order to determine the policies, institutions, or processes that perform
best in an environment of selfish agents. This approach follows the postulation formu-
lated by Roth (2002) that markets should be designed by using engineering tools, such as
experimentation and computation. More specifically, most AB electricity market models
center around questions of market power and market mechanisms. The comparison be-
tween pay-as-bid and uniform pricing is a very popular research question analyzed with
AB approaches. Another important research issue for AB electricity modelers is the as-
sessment of market power potential under different market structures or market mechan-
isms.
In this paper, the potential of agent-based modeling for analyzing market structures and
market designs with the aim of advising decision makers in the electricity sector is dis-
cussed. Procedures of model building and model validation are presented, and current
weaknesses of the methodology are pointed out in Section 2. In Section 3, an example of
an agent-based electricity sector simulation model developed by the authors is described,
and simulation results from this model are presented. Finally, Section 4 concludes and
gives an outlook on further research directions to be conducted in the agent-based elec-
tricity market simulation field.
2 Procedure of agent-based modeling for regulation advice
In the following, the state of the art of the methodology is briefly discussed, with a special
focus on its applications to electricity market modeling. Some basic concepts that char-
acterize and motivate the use of agent-based approaches are presented in Section 2.1. The
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model building process is described in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 discusses the important
issue of (empirical) model validation.
2.1 Concepts and motivation for ACE models
According to Axtell (2000), one main motivation for agent-based models is the dissa-
tisfaction with rational agents. Thus, he argues, all agent-based models involve some
form of boundedly rational agents. In fact, many economists argue that people, although
they might try to be rational, have natural limits to perception and information collec-
tion, memory, and computational capacity, and can consequently rarely meet the re-
quirement of information or foresight that rational models impose. A realistic assump-
tion in electricity market modeling is that agents do not have all information necessary
for making an optimal choice of an action to take in order to maximize profits. Instead,
they can learn to behave profitably through repeated interaction with the environment
they are placed in.
Consequently, the most prominent approach of modeling bounded rationality that can
be found in the AB electricity market modeling literature is the gradual amelioration of
activities through learning, dynamic adaptation, or evolution. Learning and adaptation
are obvious representations of human behavior in complex economic situations. As for
their realism and usefulness for modeling agents in many economic systems, Batten
(2000) postulates that [l]earning and adaptation should not be addenda to the central
theory of economics. They should be at its core, especially in problems of high complex-
ity.
Another essential element of agent-based modeling is heterogeneity. AB modelers are not
restricted to equally sized or symmetric firms, or to other constraints that arise from the
limits of analytical modeling. Instead, every agent making up the modeled economy can
be designed independently. The economy then evolves as a result of the interplay of these
heterogeneous agents, i.e. from the bottom-up. Heterogeneity is an important charac-
teristic of real-world electricity markets. Generator agents differ in size and spatial po-
sition, they own and operate different generating technologies (e.g. fossil, nuclear or re-
newable power plants) with different marginal costs and technical attributes, or they
have different strategic characteristics (e.g. vertically integrated or not). During the pro-
cess of trading, they further differentiate from each other through the individual experi-
ence they gain from trading. While no agent has complete information about the global
state, each of them accumulates some knowledge of which strategies might be more or
less successful when competing with the rest of the population. On this basis, each agent
decides how best to act subsequently in order to maximize profits. By this means, ag-
gregate system behavior, such as collusion, might be observed. Agent-based simulation
is a natural and intuitive way of representing this agent heterogeneity, as it offers much
more flexibility in defining each individual market participant than do analytical mod-
eling methods.
2.2 Model building
There are only few guidelines proposed for the design and implementation process of
agent-based simulation models. As a start, basic principles of simulation procedures
used in other disciplines also apply to agent-based simulation. Law (2007) for example
provides helpful guidance for building simulation models and analyzing output data;
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Gilbert/Troitzsch (2005) describe simulation methodologies in the social sciences, in-
cluding some hints for agent-based modeling.
According to Tesfatsion (2002), the ACE modeling procedure can be described as fol-
lows: After having (i) defined the research questions to resolve, the ACE modeler (ii)
constructs an economy comprising an initial population of agents and subsequently
(iii) specifies the initial state of the economy by defining the initial attributes of the agents
(e.g. type characteristics, learning behavior, knowledge about itself and other agents); the
modeler then (iv) lets the economy evolve over time without further intervention – all
events that subsequently occur must arise from the historical time-line of agent-agent
interactions, without extraneous coordination; this procedure is followed by (v) a careful
analysis of simulation results and an evaluation of the regularities observed in the data.
In AB electricity simulations, the most common agents that make up the population are
generators, load serving entities, and a market or system operator. Depending on the
research questions, the simulation can also contain regulator agents, a transmission sys-
tem representation, retail customers, or others. Agents can also be composed of other
agents, thus permitting hierarchical constructions, like e.g. utilities.
At the subsequent step of model building, that is model description and publication, AB
electricity market modelers proceed in heterogeneous ways. It would be helpful if some
standard way of model description, as it is conventional for other economic methodol-
ogies, became accepted for AB modeling in the medium-term. This description should
include information about the number of runs conducted, the applied parameter values,
and all other model details that allow for reproducing the described simulations. In order
to make agent-based simulations better understandable and publishable, Richiardi et al.
(2006) give some practical suggestions towards a standardized methodological protocol
of AB simulations; they propose to:
– include references to the theoretical background of the economic phenomenon that is
investigated, including simulation and non-simulation literature;
– state the main features of the simulation model (treatment of time: discrete or con-
tinuous, treatment of fate: stochastic or deterministic, coordination structure: centra-
lized or decentralized, and others) clearly and immediately in order to facilitate under-
standing and model comparison;
– follow well-defined processes for data analysis, including accepted calibration, vali-
dation and sensitivity analysis techniques;
– use standard modeling languages such as the Unified Modeling Language (UML) for
describing the static and dynamic properties of the model and use AB modeling toolk-
its, in order to make models more easily replicable.
Moreover, making model source codes publicly available would greatly benefit the re-
search field, because researchers could revise and check the implementations of others
and could also reuse parts of them1.
1 For a positive step into this direction see Leigh Tesfatsion’s site at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tes-
fatsi/ElectricOSS.htm.
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2.3 Validation of agent-based simulation models
The difficulty of validating ACE model outcomes against empirical data remains one of
the challenges for the ACE methodology.2 Only few guidelines for calibrating and va-
lidating agent-based simulation models have yet been defined. While standard verifica-
tion and validation techniques for simulation models (e.g. described by Sargent 2005,
Gilbert/Troitzsch 2005, or Law 2007) can and should also be applied for AB simulations,
it is difficult to establish credibility in the implemented agent behavior.
Many models presented in the agent-based electricity modeling literature are not empiri-
cally validated. In their survey of the relevant literature, Weidlich/Veit 2008a illustrate
this finding, which is consistent with other surveys of agent-based electricity market
models that we are aware of, such as Shun-Kun/Jia-Hai (2005) who present some selec-
tive papers and nicely show how the ACE methodology is ranged within other methods
of economics, or Sensfuß et al. (2007) who also take into account models of long-term
decision making in the power industry. The researchers who report about the (empirical)
validation of their AB electricity market model Macal/North 2005 are one example) pro-
ceeded in heterogeneous ways. Very recently, the need for reliable validation techniques
has obviously been recognized. AB researchers have analyzed and suggested procedures
and guidelines for calibrating and validating agent-based simulation models, e.g. Wind-
rum et al. (2007), Marks (2008), Richiardi et al. (2006), Midgley et al. (2007), and a
whole journal special issue is devoted to this topic (Fagiolo et al. 2007). These general
suggestions should now be assessed from the perspective of their usefulness for electricity
modeling purposes. The development of guidelines for assuring the reliability and valid-
ity of AB electricity models would greatly benefit the research quality and diminish the
heterogeneity of approaches in this field. It is a necessary step for reducing skepticism
and ensuring the quality of the methodology.
Windrum et al. (2007) review some empirical validation techniques that could be used to
ensure validity of AB models. They first examine how the output of an AB simulation can
be analyzed. The model outcome is characterized by a set of statistics that are computed
from data generated by the model data generation process. As most processes in AB si-
mulations are stochastic in nature, several simulation runs with varying random number
seeds are necessary. By exploring a sufficiently large number of points in the space of
initial conditions and parameter values, and by computing a set of statistics at each point,
one can gain an understanding of the behavior of the model data generation process.
In order to ameliorate the problem of empirical model validation, LeBaron (2006) makes
three suggestions (his focus is on financial markets): The first is to attempt to construct
an AB model such that it replicates empirical features which are not well replicated by
standard models. The second one is to put as many parameters as possible under evolu-
tionary control in order to find optimal values for crucial parameters. The third sugges-
tion is to use insights gained from experimental economics in order to build more rea-
listic learning dynamics.
2 It should be noticed that some researchers argue that AB models are only suitable for qualitative
analysis. This would entail that AB models can solely test theories in the form of causal relations-
hips, and calibration would be less an issue. Validation could not be grounded on a comparison with
empirical data in this case (see Pyka/Fagiolo 2005, or Windrum et al. 2007 for this discussion). In
contrast, most of the latest papers on AB model validation consider empirical validation.
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Moss/Edmonds (2005) propose to cross-validate AB models. They argue that the micro
level of an AB model is best investigated qualitatively while the macro level should be
investigated using quantitative methods. When the agents’ behavior and interaction on
the micro level is able to generate the macro level phenomena sharing the statistical char-
acteristics of data from the real-world system, then the model is cross-validated: the mi-
cro level behavior is validated qualitatively by domain experts, and the macro level data
is validated by comparing statistical properties of numerical outputs from the model with
statistics of the real-world system.
Werker/Brenner (2004) propose an advanced methodology for calibrating and validating
AB simulation models based on Critical Realism. It proceeds in three steps which involve
(i) setting possible model specifications (parameters, interactions), where the assump-
tions on which the model is built should be induced from empirical data whenever
this is possible; a set of several plausible models with certain parameter ranges results
from this first step; (ii) running each model specification many times and comparing the
tested model specifications to empirical observations, rejecting model specifications that
are not confirmed by the empirical data; finally, (iii) identify the underlying mechanisms
driving the part of the world that should be described and explained using abduction.
In this paper, we want to advertise for a two-level validation which considers both the
micro and the macro level of an agent-based model. Micro-validation entails ensuring
that the applied learning algorithm (or other behavioral representation) adequately re-
flects the behavior of the agents. Some papers describing AB electricity market models do
not report on a careful micro-validation. In the described models, learning or adaptation
is implemented in very heterogeneous ways. The choice of the learning algorithm itself is
often not argued and justified; most authors do not answer the question why a specific
learning model has been chosen and how good it performs in comparison to alternative
behavioral representations. In contrast to this modeling practice, the implications of
using specific learning models should be analyzed carefully before simulation outcomes
are interpreted on a higher level of abstraction. It should be carefully tested – if necessary
with a simplified scenario – whether bidding behavior patterns of the agents in the elec-
tricity market correspond to a desirable behavior, or to a behavior that can be expected in
real-world markets.
During the macro-validation procedure, macro variables that result from the interaction
of the agents participating in the modeled markets are analyzed. In electricity market
models, these macro-variables are usually market prices that result from the agents’ in-
teractions, given the data input that characterizes the supply and demand side, and the
market structure and rules. The simulated macro variable values are then compared to
empirically observed values in order to verify if simulation outcomes resemble those ob-
served at the real-world electricity markets. Law (2007) proposes several procedures for
comparing real-world observations and simulation output data, such as the basic or the
correlated inspection approach, the confidence-interval approach or the time-series ap-
proach. These are also applicable to AB electricity market simulations.
3 Example: An agent-based simulation model of electricity and emissions
trading
As an example of an agent-based simulation model that can be applied for economic pol-
icy advice, we present here a model that represents the German electricity sector. It com-
prises three markets, which play an important role in short-term wholesale power trading:
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a day-ahead electricity market at which hourly contracts for physical power delivery on
the following day are traded, a market for positive minute reserve (balancing power mar-
ket), where capacity that is held in reserve for regulating imbalances is procured by the
transmission system operators, and an exchange for CO2 emission allowances. The model
has been developed within the research project PowerACE and represents the part of the
implementation that is concerned with short-term wholesale power trading; some con-
cepts of the whole implementation are described in Weidlich et al. (2008).
Following the agent-based paradigm, all relevant parts of the electricity sector simula-
tion model are modeled as agents. The set of agents comprises market operators, elec-
tricity generators, load serving entities, and CO2 market participants. Market operators
collect supply and demand bids from registered agents and carry out the market clearing.
Generator agents operate power plants and sell their generation output either on the day-
ahead electricity market or – if their power plants meet the technical requirements for
delivering minute reserve – on the balancing power market, and buy or sell CO2 emission
allowances if they operate fossil fuel fired plants. They are characterized by their power
plant portfolios, where each plant is defined through several parameters such as its (con-
stant) marginal generation cost, the net installed capacity, no-load costs, or its emission
factor, denoting how much CO2 emissions are associated with every MWh of output.
Load serving entities demand electricity on the day-ahead market; they represent a fixed,
price-insensitive hourly load. CO2 market participants other than the generator agents
constitute the external demand and supply of allowances. They are characterized by their
demand or supply quantities and a valuation at which they like to sell or buy CO2 emis-
sion allowances.
As depicted in Figure 1, all agents inherit basic methods from one abstract super class
(PowerACEAgent). The three markets are subclasses of the MarketOperator class, and
Figure 1 UML class diagram of agents in the simulation model
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market participants inherit parts of the Trader agent class. In order to ensure that agents
can submit correctly formed bids, they implement the corresponding interface of the
market (DayAheadBidder, BalancingBidder, CO2Bidder). Agents of the AdaptiveGen-
erator class are able to trade on all three markets, and they can act strategically on
the two electricity markets. Agents of the LoadServingEntity type do not act strategically.
The model implementation uses the Recursive Porus Agent Simulation Toolkit (Repast),
which is a JAVA-based class library that facilitates agent-based simulations.3 A presenta-
tion of the simulation model is also given in Weidlich/Veit (2008b), in which results from
other simulation scenarios are presented. The model description provided in the follow-
ing reproduces parts of this previous paper and presents results from new simulation
runs.
3.1 Simulated markets
The day-ahead market (DAM) is modeled as a sequence of 24 simple call markets for
every delivery hour of the following day. Each agent i submits offers for each of its Gi
generating units g. As in the simulations presented here the balancing power market is
cleared first, the available capacity that an agent can govern in the day-ahead market
depends on the trading results on this first market. The capacity an agent has committed
on the balancing power market is subtracted from the net installed capacity qnet of this
plant, resulting in the available capacity qavail.
One supply offer consists of a quantity and the price at which the quantity is offered. The
agent formulates the offers according to the output of the reinforcement learning algo-
rithm (see Section 3.2 for a description of agent learning), thereby finding the best actions
over a two-dimensional action domain. The price dimension allows offer prices from 0 to
100 EUR/MWh, in 21 discrete steps; the offer quantity that agents can choose ranges
from fractions of b ¼ 0 to 100 % of the available capacity, in six discrete steps. The
set of offers submitted to the day-ahead market by agent i for delivery hour h, which
contains separate offers for each generating unit g (bDAMh;i;g ) is denoted B
DAM
h;i and is defined
as follows:
BDAMh;i ¼ pDAMh;i;g ;qDAMh;i;g
D E
: g ¼ 1; :::;Gi
n o
ð1Þ
with qDAMh;i;g ¼ bh;i;g  qavailh;i;g ; 0  qDAMh;i;g  q
DAM;avail
h;i;g ð2Þ
Market clearing is effected by sorting all supply offers in ascending, and demand bids in
descending price order. In case of equal bid prices, bids are sorted in descending volume
order; priority between two identical bids is determined randomly.4 The intersection of
the so-formed supply and demand curves sets the resulting price PDAMh at which all suc-
cessful bids are remunerated.
The implemented balancing power market (BPM) represents procurement auctions for
positive minute reserve, and is designed in a similar fashion as the minute reserve auc-
tions operated by the four German transmission system operators. Agents with power
3 For a description and download of the toolkit, see http://repast.sourceforge.net.
4 Before the clearing process, all bids are randomized in order to avoid unintended recurrent priorities
in cases of identical bids.
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plants that are technically able to deliver minute reserve can sell capacity on this market.
The capability of minute reserve delivery is expressed through the indicator function
Iðg;MRÞ which is equal to zero if plant g is slowly controllable (not suitable for minute
reserve delivery) and one if plant g is fast controllable and can, thus, be offered on the
BPM.
An offer on the balancing power market contains a quantity in MW offered over the
whole bidding period, and of two prices: the capacity price, i.e. the price for holding
capacity in reserve during the bidding period, and the energy price; i.e. the price a gen-
erator is paid for produced minute reserve in case his plant is actually deployed for reg-
ulating purposes. Similarly to the day-ahead market, the domain of possible actions on
the balancing power market is two-dimensional. While all agents offer their whole avail-
able capacity on the balancing power market, the two dimensions contain possible ca-
pacity prices and energy prices. Admissible prices range from 0 to 200 EUR/MW in 21
discrete steps for the capacity (cap) price and from 0 to 100 EUR/MWh in five steps for
the energy price.
In the scenarios presented here, the BPM is carried out first, so the available capacity for
all power plants is equal to their respective net capacities. After choosing an action from
the learning algorithm, the agent formulates the offer that he wants to submit to the









: g ¼ 1; :::;GijIðg;MRÞ ¼ 1
n o
ð3Þ
with qBPMk;i;g ¼ q
BPM;avail
k;i;g ð4Þ
The demand side of the balancing power market is represented as a predefined quantity
of positive minute reserve that has to be procured. Six equally long bidding blocks of four
hours length are differentiated for every trading day: from 0:00 to 4:00 am, from 4:00 to
8:00 am, and so forth. The tendered balancing capacity quantity QBPMk is equal for every
bidding block (for the simulations presented in this chapter, QBPMk ¼ 3,500 MW 8 k).
During market clearing, offers are sorted by their capacity price; offers with the lowest
capacity price are considered first for holding capacity in reserve, until demand is met. If
minute reserve is actually needed for frequency control on the day of delivery, deploy-
ment is decided among the offers of those plants that are held in reserve on the trading
day. A merit order is then constructed based on the energy price only, and offers with
lowest energy prices are deployed first, until demand is met. Payments both for holding
capacity in reserve and for delivering energy for regulating purposes are the respective
offer prices.
All generator agents that own fossil fuel fired power plants are initially endowed with a
certain amount of CO2 allowances. In accordance with current emissions trading regu-
lation, the initial allocation of allowances is calculated according to the grandfathering
rule, i.e. based on past emissions for each single power plant. Agents can trade their need
or surplus of allowances on the allowance market.
The CO2 emission allowance market (CO2M) is executed at the end of each trading day.
It is assumed that all agents seek to even up their open positions every day. This entails
that agents who sell electricity also make sure to have enough allowances for the carbon
dioxide emissions associated to their generation output. Agents who have surplus allow-
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ances try to sell them at the market price. The option of speculating for rising or falling
allowance prices is neglected in this model.
The agent’s daily trading quantities are calculated on the basis of initial endowments
qCO2;inity issued for year y, and of trading success on the current trading day. The amount
of carbon dioxide emitted during electricity generation, qemit, is determined by volumes
sold at the day-ahead electricity market qDAM;sold and by deployed minute reserve
qBPM;depl.5 The quantities are multiplied with the emission factor xg of plant g, quantify-












The remaining allowance budget that an agent has at its disposal at time t (day of the year
y) is divided by the remaining days for which the allowances were issued, in order to
calculate a daily budget. This budget is subtracted from the allowance quantity needed
for power generation, thus resulting in the bid/offer quantity that agent i submits to the
CO2 market operator. In consequence, if an agent’s budget for the current day is larger
than the need for allowances, his bid quantity becomes negative, which corresponds to a
selling offer.
qCO2Mt;i ¼ qCO2;emitt;i 
qCO2 ; budt;i
365 t  1 ð6Þ
Bids on the CO2 allowance market contain a volume of allowances that is offered or
asked, a bid price, and the compliance period (cp) for which the allowance should be
valid (for simplicity, and because no speculation is considered, the compliance period
is always equal to the current period). Buying bids have positive volumes, and selling
offers have negative volumes. All agents submit one single daily bid on the allowance
market, representing their requirement or surplus calculated over all power plants
they own.
bCO2Mt;i ¼ pCO2Mt;i ;qCO2Mt;i ; cp
D E
ð7Þ
The CO2 emission allowance market is modeled as a sealed bid double auction. Demand
and supply bids are summed up to form supply and demand functions in the same way as
on the day-ahead electricity market, and the uniform market clearing price is determined
by the intersection of both curves.
The remaining allowance budget is updated at the end of each trading day by subtracting
the amount of allowances used for emitted CO2 quantities from the current budget and
by adding the resulting trading volumes (positive for bought allowances, negative for
sold volumes) to it. The budget at time t ¼ 0 is the initial allowance quantity issued
for year y through the grandfathering procedure.
5 If the deployment of minute reserve becomes necessary, this would occur one day after trading on
the balancing power market. For simplicity, it is assumed that minute reserve quantities actually
deployed are already known on the trading day. In real-world practice, only around 2 % of procured
minute reserve capacity is actually deployed for frequency regulation (Bundesnetzagentur 2006} so
these quantities are negligible.
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Agents do not act strategically on the market for CO2 emission allowances – they do not
set bidding strategies through reinforcement learning. However, the costs incurred from
allowance prices influence trading strategies on the electricity markets, as specified in the
following section.
3.2 Agent learning and market interrelations
For each market in which they act strategically, agents choose new actions from instances
of a reinforcement learning algorithm, and then formulate their bids according to this
chosen action. Agents learn strategies separately for the day-ahead and for the balancing
power market. Moreover, strategies for each bidding block on the balancing power mar-
ket and for each hour on the day-ahead market are learned separately.
While optimizing their supply offers, agents consider opportunity costs that they could
have achieved on the other market if they had sold their capacity there. Prices for CO2
emission allowances are also included into the reinforcement as opportunity costs, be-
cause a generator would always have the opportunity to solely sell certificates, thereby
realizing a profit.
The three markets that form the electricity sector simulation model are interrelated
through the agents’ bidding strategies. A power generator has the choice to offer his gen-
erating capacity on the DAM or on the BPM for the following day (for those plants that
fulfill the technical requirements to deliver minute reserve), and has to trade off between
these two options. After market clearing on the first market, an agent can offer his re-
maining unsold capacity on the second market. Through varying the offer quantity on
the day-ahead market, agents can influence and optimize their joint strategy on both
power markets.
The behavioral representation of the agent’s search for profit maximizing strategies is
modeled with Q-learning (Watkins 1989) and variants of the Erev/Roth (1998) algo-
rithm. For this learning algorithm, different states have to be defined. In the simulations
applying Q-learning, the states are based on bid prices and trading success. Bid prices are
categorized as low (lower than or equal to one third of the maximum admissible bid
price), high (higher than or equal to two thirds of the maximum admissible price) or
medium (all remaining prices). A bid is further categorized as marginal or intra-margin-
al, in which case it is a successful bid, or as extra-marginal for a bid that was not suc-
cessful. All combinations of bid prices and success form the six states that are differen-
tiated in this model.
Reinforcements R that are fed back to the update function of the learning algorithm are
calculated for both power markets after all markets have cleared on the current trading
day. They are based on the profit p earned on the respective market. Reinforcements are
set relative to the maximum possible profit pmax that an agent can earn on the market.
Consequently, the range of possible reinforcements 0  R  1 is the same for all learning
tasks; initial Q-values or propensities are set to Q0 ¼ 1. Maximum profits depend on
variable costs cvar of the power plant deployed, and are different across plants.
Agents that own a portfolio of generating units set and learn offers separately for each
plant. The reinforcement for learning the bidding strategy of one plant, however, con-
tains some information about the performance of the whole portfolio. The influence of
the whole portfolio profit on the reinforcement is set through the portfolio integration
parameter w. Throughout the simulations presented here, it is set to w ¼ 0:5. Reinforce-
ments on the day-ahead market are defined as follows:
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RDAMh;i;g ¼ ð1 wÞ  pDAMh;i;g =p
DAM;max

















pDAM;maxi;g ¼ qneti;g  PDAM;max  cvar ð10Þ










The reinforcement for trading on the balancing power market is defined in a similar
manner as on the day-ahead market. If no minute reserve energy is actually delivered,
profits are only defined by capacity prices and by no load costs (nolc), i.e. the cost for
keeping the power plant in a stand-by state. For the calculation of pBPM;max, only capacity
prices are considered.
RBPMk;i;g ¼ ð1 wÞ  pBPMk;i;g =p
BPM;max
i;g þ w 
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As specified in Section 2.3, the micro-validation procedure requires a detailed analysis of
which behavioral representation is best suited for modeling agents engaged in daily re-
peated electricity trading. In this context, tests of different learning algorithms have been
carried out by the authors. This micro-validation procedure will not be reported here.
However, we want to advertise one measure to enhance validity of results: if several
learning models are deemed appropriate for representing agent behavior, comparative
runs applying different learning models should be conducted, so that simulation results
from one learning model are confirmed by runs applying alternative learning models.
From the micro-validation procedure we found that Q-learning and several variants of
the learning model formulated by Erev/Roth (1998) are suitable to model learning in the
developed agent-based simulation model of the German electricity sector. The Erev and
Roth algorithm has proved to adequately represent empirically observed human learning
in several kinds of games; Q-learning is used in several ACE papers and offers desirable
properties from a machine learning perspective (convergence to optimality under certain
conditions). In the following, results from Q-learning simulations are presented primar-
ily. A more detailed comparison of the different learning algorithms applied in this model
is given in Weidlich (2008).
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On the basis of a properly micro-validated learning model, the next validation step can
proceed. The macro-validation procedure entails the analysis of macro variables that
result from the interaction of the agents participating in the modeled markets. Here,
market prices that come out of simulations with the electricity sector model, run
with data input that realistically represents the German electricity sector, are compared
to empirically observed prices in the year 2006. The overall power plant structure is
represented in an aggregate way, based on published data about installed capacities.
The four dominant players in the German power market are represented in more detail,
and further players are introduced so that the overall installed capacity and the propor-
tions of different power plant technologies (coal-fired, gas-fired, hydro etc.) are properly
represented. The merit order of the total installed capacity by all agents is depicted in the
appendix (Figure 9).
The system’s total load data provided by the Union for the Co-Ordination of Transmis-
sion of Electricity (UCTE) constitutes the data input for the demand side. Simulation
results are compared to empirically observed prices at the European Energy Exchange
(EEX) spot market and at the German balancing power markets for those days for which
the system’s total load is known from UCTE data (i.e. every third Wednesday of a
month). In addition, average daily courses of prices over all workdays of the same month
are calculated and compared to the simulation outcomes. The load profiles applied in the
simulations presented in this paper are graphically displayed in the appendix (Figure 10).
Simulations that apply Q-learning as the agents’ behavioral representation are run with a
learning rate of a ¼ 0:5, a discount rate of c ¼ 0:9, and an E-greedy action selection rule
with E ¼ 0:2. Other simulations apply the original Erev and Roth reinforcement learning
algorithm or its modification as formulated by Nicolaisen et al. (2001), both with pro-
portional action selection, a recency value of u ¼ 0:1, and an experimentation value of
E ¼ 0:2. Simulations ran over 7,300 iterations. The outcome of one simulation run is
defined as the average price over the last 365 iterations. Due to the stochastic nature
of reinforcement learning, simulations are repeated ten times with different random
number seeds at each run. The outcome of one simulation scenario is represented by
the average over the ten repetitions for this scenario.
Figures 2 and 3 show examples for simulation results. Continuous lines plot the simu-
lation outcome for the third Wednesdays of the simulated month; dashed lines plot the
empirically observed prices of the same days, and chain dotted lines represent average
Figure 2 Example results for September 2006: simulated and real-world prices on the day-
ahead (left) and balancing power market (right)
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prices over all workdays of the specific month. Left figures display hourly results on the
day-ahead market, where empirically observed prices correspond to prices for hourly
contracts fixed in the daily EEX spot auction. Right figures show results from the simu-
lated balancing power market for the six bidding blocks, and the empirically observed
prices are the averages over the prices published by the four balancing market operators.
Prices in summer, spring and fall months (see example in Figure 2) are quite closely re-
produced by the simulation model. Prices in winter months (see example in Figure 3),
however, show larger deviation between simulation outcomes and real-world prices.
In some hours, prices even exceed 100 EUR/MWh; as the agents’ action domain in
the simulation model only allows for bid prices up to 100 EUR/MWh, prices above
this level cannot be replicated by construction of the model. Enlarging the action domain
might be a way to ensure that prices higher than 100 EUR/MWh can also be simulated.
However, a sensitivity analysis reveals that simulation outcomes are quite sensitive to-
wards the definition of the agents’ action domain. If the range of possible bid prices on
the day-ahead market is augmented to 110, 120 or 150 EUR/MWh, average yearly prices
rise by 6.2, 12.5, and 31.3 %, respectively.
Variability between different runs (i.e. runs with different random number seeds) is very
low for simulations with Q-learning. The standard deviation for the resulting prices of
the ten repetitions ranges between 0.2 and 2.3 EUR/MWh for different hours on the day-
ahead electricity market and between 0.05 and 3.9 EUR/MW for bidding blocks on the
balancing power market. With these low variances, one single simulation run already
delivers meaningful and reliable results. Variances for simulations applying Erev and
Roth reinforcement learning are considerably higher. The standard deviations of the sin-
gle observations are between 3.3 and 13.0 EUR/MWh on the day-ahead and 0.0 and
29.0 EUR/MW on the balancing power market when applying the original algorithm,
and 3.4–17.9 EUR/MWh (DAM) and 0.0–24.5 EUR/MW (BPM) for simulations with
the modified Erev and Roth algorithm. Thus, simulations applying Erev and Roth re-
inforcement learning should be repeated more often.
The simulated prices observed on the day-ahead market and on the balancing power
market in one month stem from the same simulation run, and are a consequence of agents
bidding subsequently on both markets (and in addition on the market for CO2 emission
allowances) and optimizing their strategies in face of market interrelations. The demand
on the balancing power market, i.e. the tendered minute reserve quantity, is equal for all
Figure 3 Example results for February 2006: simulated and real-world prices on the day-ahead
(left) and balancing power market (right)
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bidding blocks. This market is cleared first, and the day-ahead market is operated sub-
sequently. As the available supply capacity and the demand quantity in the balancing
power market is the same in every hour, differences in prices between the bidding blocks
can only result from the inclusion of opportunity costs in the agent’s reasoning. The si-
mulation outcome on the balancing power market shows characteristic daily courses of
prices, with higher capacity prices in the third and fourth bidding block – and fifth in
winter months – and lower prices in nocturnal bidding blocks. Similar characteristics can
be observed in the real-world balancing power markets in Germany.
The confidence-interval approach as described in Law (2007) has been applied to the
outcomes of this basic simulation scenario; a description of the methodology and the
calculations for the reference scenario are described in Weidlich (2008). Results confirm
that simulated prices are not significantly different from real-world prices of the same
day. This is observed for Q-learning with E-greedy action selection, and both the original
and modified variant of the Erev and Roth reinforcement learning algorithm with pro-
portional action selection. Thus, the developed model is deemed an appropriate and va-
lid representation of the real-world system under study.
3.4 Measuring the impact of emissions trading
The data presented in the preceding section corresponds to simulations in which emis-
sion allowance trading was integrated – just like in the real-world market of the corre-
sponding time frame. In further simulation runs, it is tested how emissions trading affects
prices on the electricity markets. For this purpose, scenarios without CO2 emissions trad-
ing are run and compared to the basic scenario results. The outcome of this comparison is
depicted in Figures 4 and 5 for the day-ahead and balancing power market, respectively.
As prices on both electricity markets are strongly influenced by the system’s total load,
simulated prices are sorted by demand quantities in the corresponding hours (DAM), or
Figure 4 Impact of CO2 emissions trading on day-ahead electricity
prices
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by average demand over the four hours constituting a bidding bloc (BPM). Demand is
plotted at the second ordinate.
It can be seen that a large fraction of opportunity costs resulting from the possibility of
selling CO2 emission allowances is successfully passed over to electricity market offers,
which ultimately raises prices at the day-ahead market and also at the balancing power
market. Because of different emission situations in the single hours, the absolute increase
in electricity prices is not constant across the observations. In hours of low demand, the
introduction of emissions trading has hardly any effect on day-ahead electricity prices,
whereas the difference in prices is considerable in high demand hours. Over a large range
of intermediate demand situations, deviations between the scenarios with and without
emissions trading fluctuate to some extent.
The intuition behind this result is that these hours with similar demand situations belong
to different months, and CO2 prices differ across months. Hours with very high demand
all belong to the winter months in which demand is high and consequently many fossil
fuel power plants are operated, resulting in (evenly) higher CO2 allowance prices. As a
consequence, it can be concluded that emissions trading considerably influences electri-
city prices and that it is the main cause for differences in prices resulting for hours with
similar demand situations. This characteristic is observed on both the day-ahead and the
balancing power market. Yearly average prices are 13.3 % higher for scenarios with
emissions trading on the day-ahead market, and 56.8 % higher on the balancing power
market (for simulations with Q-learning).
3.5 Varying the settlement rule at the balancing power market
In procurement auctions with two-part bids, the market clearing procedure distinguishes
two aspects: the scoring rule and the settlement rule (Chao/Wilson 2002). The scoring
rule defines how to compare bids, and the settlement rule determines payments. Basi-
cally, two options for payments of successful bids are discussed in the literature and em-
Figure 5 Impact of CO2 emissions trading on minute reserve capacity
prices
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ployed in practice: uniform price and discriminatory pay-as-bid settlement. In the former
case, one market clearing price is determined – usually the price of the highest successful
bid – which is paid to all successful bidders, whereas in the latter case, which is also
applied in the model presented here, every successful bid is paid its bid price. In European
balancing power markets, both settlement rules are employed. In Germany, Austria and
the United Kingdom for example, pay-as-bid pricing is applied, whereas Sweden, Nor-
way, Spain and the Netherlands opted for uniform pricing (Swider 2006).
The question which settlement rule is less vulnerable to strategic bidding is discussed in
many research papers and leads to mixed results, e.g. Ausubel/Cramton (2002), Bin-
more/Swierzbinski (2000), Kahn et al. (2001). Also, different publications about
agent-based electricity market simulations pursue comparisons between pay-as-bid
and uniform pricing, e.g. Bakirtzis/Tellidou (2006), Bin et al. (2004), Bower/Bunn
(2001), Cincotti et al. (2006), Weidlich/Veit (2006), Xiong et al. (2004). Most agent-
based simulations come to the conclusion that the pay-as-bid mechanism leads agents
to bid at higher prices, but overall average procurement costs are still lower under
this mechanism than under uniform pricing.
Figure 6 shows a comparison of minute reserve prices for both settlement rules applied in
our model. Results reveal that overall market prices are higher in the uniform pricing
case than under pay-as-bid pricing. From Figure 6 (left) it becomes observable that price
differences between minute reserve procurement auctions with uniform pricing and with
pay-as-bid pricing are notable especially in the bidding blocs with high system load, with
absolute differences around 14–16 EUR/MW (note that prices in this plot rank from 0 to
100 EUR/MW).
The application of the paired-t confidence interval method6 Law (2007) at a 90 % level
confirms that resulting prices under uniform pricing are statistically significantly higher
than under discriminatory pricing, with only some exceptions; the corresponding lower
and upper confidence interval endpoints are depicted in Figure 6, for Q-learning simula-
tions).
Figure 6 Impact of BPM settlement rule on minute reserve capacity prices; average prices (left)
and confidence intervals (right)
6 This method constructs a confidence interval around the differences between resulting prices of two
scenarios in order to quantify how strong scenario outcomes deviate from each other. For all sce-
narios, the same set of random number seeds is used and the outcome from a run of one scenario is
paired with the run of the other scenario that uses the same random number seed.
Agent-Based Simulations for Electricity Market Regulation Advice . 165
The yearly average of minute reserve prices in Q-learning simulations is 30.73 EUR/MW
with pay-as-bid pricing, and 36.72 EUR/MW (+ 19.5 %) in the uniform pricing case. If
Erev and Roth reinforcement learning is applied, results are slightly less definite, but
generally confirm the findings from Q-learning simulations nonetheless. While with
Q-learning, uniform prices are higher than average pay-as-bid prices in every single bid-
ding bloc, simulations with Erev and Roth RL show some bidding blocs in which the
respective average pay-as-bid price is higher than the uniform price. However, yearly
average prices over all bidding blocs are also higher with uniform pricing (+ 15.15 %
if the original Erev and Roth algorithm is applied, and + 28.9 % in simulations with
the modified algorithm).
When comparing prices on the day-ahead market for the tested two settings with diffe-
rent settlement rules applied on the balancing power market, only very small differences
can be observed. Yearly average prices are less than 1 % higher in the uniform pricing
case than with pay-as-bid (Q-learning simulations). However, this tendency is only con-
firmed by simulations with the original Erev and Roth RL, while those applying the mod-
ified algorithm result in negligably higher prices for pay-as-bid settlement. So, no sig-
nificant difference of prices on the day-ahead market is found for the two tested scenar-
ios. This result allows another conclusion, i.e. that opportunity costs resulting from the
balancing power market hardly affect day-ahead prices, while, vice versa, balancing po-
wer prices are strongly influenced by resulting day-ahead prices. This observation is con-
sistent with experts’ assessments about (wholesale) market interrelations in the German
electricity sector.
3.6 Assessing the implications of plant divestiture measures
In her 16th Main Report, the German Monopolies Commission (2006) “regards super-
vision of competition in the wholesale electricity and regulated energy markets as inade-
quate. The need for special supervision of competition on these markets is due to their
particular vulnerability to supply strategies by generating companies that have sufficient
market power to influence prices.” Generators with market power are usually under-
stood as firms who can set prices above marginal generation costs while still making
positive sales (e.g. Rassenti et al. 2003).
In the German electricity sector, the four largest generating companies taken together
own 70–80 % of the total German generating capacity. In public debate, it is often pre-
sumed that these companies have market power and that they contribute to driving prices
away from competitive levels. Under the assumption that the oligopolistic structure of
the German electricity sector leads to excessive wholesale prices, it would be an adequate
policy measure to increase supply side competition through forcing the dominant com-
panies to divest parts of their generation assets. Similar measures have been carried out in
the electricity industry of England and Wales.
The question to what extent the four large generating companies actually dispose of mar-
ket power in the German electricity markets should not be discussed here. For the fol-
lowing analysis, it is assumed that they have some potential to exert market power, and it
is tested whether divestiture measures can mitigate this potential to some extent. If re-
sults show that plant divestiture has no influence on market prices, this may either in-
validate the assumption, or it may indicate that the tested divestiture options are not
appropriate to mitigate the players’ market power exertion.
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In order to assess the impact of plant divestiture in the German electricity industry, six
divestiture scenarios have been defined and run with the present model. Results are com-
pared to the reference scenario without divestiture. In all of the tested divestiture scenarios,
it is assumed that the largest four agents defined in the model, representing the four do-
minant players of the real-world industry, have to divest a given fraction of installed ca-
pacity of all their power plant types. New agents are then introduced into the market who
each take over the whole or part of the divested capacity of one of the four large firms.
Three different fractions of divested capacity – 25 %, 33 % and 50 % – and two numbers
of new agents – four and eight – are considered; the combination of these parameter
values make up the six simulation scenarios. In the case of four new agents, they are
allocated the whole divested capacity of one of the former large firms; in the case of
eight new agents, two agents share the divested capacity of one large firm. Consequently,
each new agent has a portfolio of power plants with the same proportion of technologies
(gas-fired, coal-fired, hydro etc.) as the firm that had to divest part of its capacity. The
new agents are also endowed with the share of emission allowances associated to the
divested power plants.
Figures 7 and 8 depict resulting prices for the divestiture scenarios. In Figure 7, yearly
average prices and average prices for two selected months are plotted; Figure 8 plots
Figure 7 Monthly/yearly average prices on the day-ahead (left) and balancing power market
(right) for different divestiture scenarios
Figure 8 Impact of plant divestiture on prices on the day-ahead (left) and balancing power
market (right)
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prices for all observations from the two scenarios of 50 % capacity divestiture with four
and eight newly introduced agents.
The simulation outputs suggest that divestiture leads, in fact, to falling market prices.
Yearly average prices on the day-ahead market are reduced by 6.1 %, 7.4 % and 8.4 %
for the scenarios with four new agents, and by 6.7 %, 8.5 % and 10.9 % for the scenarios
with eight new agents, all compared to corresponding prices in the scenario without di-
vestiture. On the balancing power market, the decline in prices lies between 19.1 % and
32.3 % for the six scenarios (for Q-learning simulations).
Market prices in all divestiture scenarios are lower than prices in the case without di-
vestiture in a statistically significant manner, according to results from the paired-t con-
fidence interval approach (at a 90 % confidence level, for Q-learning simulations). The
very few (5 10) exceptions among the 288 observations for each setting on the day-
ahead market, in which differences in prices from the scenario with and without dives-
titure are not statistically significant, are the hours of highest system load. On the bal-
ancing power market, prices in all observations are statistically significantly lower in
simulations with divestiture than in those without divestiture.
It can be seen that average prices are lower in scenarios of higher amounts of divested
capacity than they are in the scenarios with lower divestiture amounts. However, these
differences in prices are only statistically significant for some observations. Moreover,
the difference in resulting prices for divestiture scenarios with four and with eight new
agents that enter into the market is only small, especially if a low share of capacity from
the large generators is divested. The difference in resulting prices in the case of four and
eight new players becomes more important when the share of divested capacity rises to
50 %. For all scenarios, differences in prices of scenarios with four new agents are only
statistically significant for some observations.
Simulations applying Erev and Roth reinforcement learning generally confirm the Q-
learning results presented here. Decreases in prices in the divestiture scenarios are be-
tween 5.0 % and 9.4 % on the day-ahead market and between 21.0 % and 34.0 %
on the balancing power market, both for simulations applying the original Erev and
Roth RL simulations; for simulations with the modified variant of Erev and Roth
RL, price decreases lie between 5.7 % and 9.7 % (DAM) and between 11.0 % and
20.1 % (BPM), all compared to the reference scenario without divestiture.
4 Conclusion and outlook
In this contribution, the methodology of agent-based electricity market modeling for
regulatory advice has been discussed and an example model developed by the authors
has been presented. The model provides insights into the aggregate system characteristics
resulting from dynamic strategic behavior in oligopolies under consideration of learning
from daily interaction. It might help a regulator to prevent market power exertion
through introducing suitable market designs or enforcing changes in the market struc-
ture.
Results from a realistic simulation scenario representing the German electricity sector
have been assessed and the impact that emissions trading, different settlement rules
on the balancing power market, and plant divestiture measures have on electricity prices
has been analyzed through the application of well-defined simulation scenarios. It has
been shown that all analyzed measures have a significant impact on electricity prices, and
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that these effects can be quantified with the help of agent-based simulations. On the
balancing power market, lower average prices are observed under pay-as-bid pricing
than under uniform pricing. Changing the ownership structure of the generating capa-
cities through divestiture leads to decreasing market prices on both the day-ahead and
the balancing power market. However, the tested divestiture scenarios only entail rather
small decreases in market prices. Given that a plant divestiture measure of the dimension
implied by the six tested scenarios is presumably very difficult to enforce from a political
perspective, the resulting effects on power market prices may not justify such drastic
changes in the market structure.
The presented model may be enhanced in several ways so as to account for more aspects
that are relevant in real-world power industries. For example, as the German electricity
system is highly intermeshed with those of the neighboring countries, the national per-
spective followed here is a simplification that may be relaxed in favor of a European view
in future work. Also, the current version of the model neglects transmission constraints; a
more realistic transmission system representation should be embraced into future ver-
sions of the model.
Given the great flexibility that AB modeling allows, and given its potential to represent
complex economic systems, ACE can surely become one important pillar of electricity
market research. While the AB electricity simulation research field is constantly matur-
ing, we still observe a large heterogeneity in simulation approaches and model descrip-
tions. Choosing valid learning models that represent boundedly rational actors in elec-
tricity markets is one issue that needs further research and consolidation; the establish-
ment of reliable and accepted validation procedures is a second important field of further
research.
Another observation of the research field is that the agents’ profits and the success of
distinct trading strategies in power markets are rarely discussed. The focus of investiga-
tion is often placed on aggregate macro-level parameters. Moreover, aspects like bilateral
trading or vertical integration could realistically be modeled in agent-based simulations,
but have not yet been extensively analyzed by agent-based modelers. Future models
might put a stronger focus on these aspects.
Although some issues of the agent-based methodology are still “under development”, AB
modelers have already been able to successfully simulate the core characteristics of to-
day’s electricity markets. Adaptive, self-seeking agents are an appropriate representation
of strategic generating companies interacting in power trading activities. Some sugges-
tions for questions that might be interesting to investigate with agent-based simulation
approaches have been pointed out for future research. As for the encouraging potential of
agent-based models for economic policy advice in the electricity sector, the proposed new
applications and a further enhancement of the methodology are strongly encouraged.
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